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ESSAY
The Shifting Tides of Merger
Litigation
Matthew D. Cain*
Jill Fisch**
Steven Davidoff Solomon***
Randall S. Thomas****
In 2015, Delaware made several important changes to its laws
concerning merger litigation. These changes, which were made in
response to a perception that levels of merger litigation were too high and
that a substantial proportion of merger cases were not providing value,
raised the bar, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to win a lawsuit
challenging a merger and more difficult for plaintiffs’ counsel to collect
a fee award.
We study what has happened in the courts in response to these
changes. We find that the initial effect of the changes has been to decrease
the volume of merger litigation, to increase the number of cases that are
dismissed, and to reduce the size of attorneys’ fee awards. At the same
time, we document an adaptive response by the plaintiffs’ bar. Merger
cases are being filed in other state courts or in federal court, presumably
in an effort to escape the application of the new Delaware rules.
This responsive adaptation offers important lessons about the
entrepreneurial nature of merger litigation and the limited ability of the
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courts to reduce the potential for litigation abuse. In particular, we find
that plaintiffs’ attorneys respond rationally to these changes by shifting
their filing patterns, and that defendants respond in kind. We argue,
however, that more expansive efforts to shut down merger litigation,
such as through the use of fee-shifting bylaws, are premature and create
too great a risk of foreclosing beneficial litigation. We also examine
Delaware’s dilemma in maintaining a balance between the rights of
managers and shareholders in this area.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, over 96% of publicly announced mergers have
attracted a shareholder lawsuit, 1 with many mergers attracting suits
in multiple jurisdictions. 2 This extraordinarily high litigation rate has
drawn criticism from those who claim that the bulk of merger litigation

1.
Private litigation is the dominant mechanism for challenging the price, fairness, or
disclosures in connection with a public company merger. SEC enforcement actions have typically
been limited to particular transaction contexts such as reverse mergers and, even in such cases,
are addressed exclusively to disclosure issues. See, e.g., Paul Rodel, A Look at Market Trends in
Reverse Mergers, LAW360 (Mar. 21, 2017, 2:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/904096/alook-at-market-trends-in-reverse-mergers [https://perma.cc/E7Y2-WHE5] (describing SEC
enforcement actions in several reverse merger cases in 2011).
2.
Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2014 (Feb. 20, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2567902
[https://perma.cc/GP7L-Q53Y].
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is frivolous. 3 Critics also observe that merger litigation is typically
settled without material benefit to shareholders but with a significant
fee paid to the lead plaintiffs’ attorneys filing the case. 4
In the summer and fall of 2015, the Delaware courts forcefully
responded to this criticism. In several decisions, judges openly
questioned the value of so-called disclosure-only merger litigation
settlements in which the only relief provided to the plaintiff class was
additional disclosure by the takeover parties. 5 In particular, the courts
criticized the lack of materiality of the additional disclosures and the
overly broad releases negotiated by the parties. 6 This judicial push back
culminated in the January 2016 Delaware Chancery Court decision, In
re Trulia, which held that the Delaware courts would no longer
countenance merger litigation settlements that did not achieve
meaningful benefits for shareholders. 7 The court specifically rejected
the proposed disclosure-only settlement in that case which provided for
additional nonmaterial disclosures, a broad release, and a fee award to
plaintiffs’ counsel. 8
At the same time, the Delaware courts significantly restricted
the substantive ability of plaintiffs to win takeover-related claims by

3.
See, e.g., Gregory A. Markel & Gillian G. Burns, Assessing a Judicial Solution to Abusive
Merger Litigation, LAW360 (Nov. 19, 2015, 9:59 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
728061/assessing-a-judicial-solution-to-abusive-merger-litigation [https://perma.cc/YG87-JB2A]
(observing that “lawsuits are filed after virtually every public merger is announced, in many cases
with little regard to the merits of the claim”).
4.
Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the Peppercorn
Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV.
557, 559 (2015). But see Phillip R. Sumpter, Adjusting Attorneys’ Fee Awards: The Delaware Court
of Chancery’s Answer to Incentivizing Meritorious Disclosure-Only Settlements, 15 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 669, 674 (2013) (defending the value of disclosure-only settlements in merger litigation).
5.
E.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at 74–75, In re Aruba
Networks Stockholder Litig., No. 10765-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2015); Transcript of Settlement and
Hearings of the Court at 14, In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG (Del.
Ch. Sept. 17, 2015); Settlement Hearing and Request for Attorneys’ Fees and the Court’s Rulings
at 45–46, Acevedo v. Aeroflex Holding Corp., No. 9730-VCL (Del. Ch. July 8, 2015).
6.
See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 591–92 (describing growing judicial criticism of
disclosure-only settlements).
7.
In re Trulia, 129 A.3d 884, 899 (Del. Ch. 2016). The Trulia court found that, because the
supplemental disclosures obtained by the plaintiffs in the settlement were not material, they
“provided no meaningful benefit to stockholders.” Id.; see also Transcript of Settlement Hearing
and Rulings of the Court at 37, 40, Assad v. World Energy Sols., Inc., No. 10324-CB (Del. Ch. Aug.
20, 2015) (stating that “it should be pretty clear from some of the questions that I’m asking and
some of the recent hearings . . . that there is a lot of concern in this court about nonmonetary
settlements,” and “there is going to be more scrutiny on some of the give and the get of these
things”).
8.
Trulia, 129 A.3d at 907.
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adopting more deferential standards of judicial review in these cases. 9
In Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, the Delaware Supreme
Court held that the business judgment rule is “the appropriate standard
of review for a post-closing damages action when a merger that is not
subject to the entire fairness standard of review has been approved by
a fully informed, uncoerced majority of the disinterested
stockholders.” 10 The Chancery Court extended Corwin’s holding in
Volcano to cases involving a tender offer. 11 The net effect of these two
cases was to limit substantially the availability of a post-closing suit for
damages. Only if the target company failed to disclose the alleged
improprieties prior to shareholder approval of the transaction would the
court allow a claim to proceed. 12
These decisions made the successful prosecution of merger
litigation cases more difficult. They reduced the likelihood that a
plaintiff could recover damages by challenging a merger involving a
Delaware corporation. In addition, they reduced the likelihood that
plaintiffs’ counsel could receive a significant fee award by bringing
litigation in the Delaware courts.
The Delaware legislature also responded to the increase in
multijurisdictional litigation. In 2015, the legislature adopted
amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law explicitly
authorizing issuers to adopt forum selection bylaws, 13 which would
enable Delaware corporations to halt the filing of merger-related suits
in multiple states. 14 Issuers’ widespread adoption of these bylaws both
before and after the legislative response provided some reason for
Delaware courts to expect that any crack-down on merger litigation
9.
Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, The Rise and Fall of Delaware’s Takeover
Standards, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES (Steven Davidoff Solomon &
Randall S. Thomas eds., forthcoming 2018).
10. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 305–06 (Del. 2015).
11. In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 750 (Del. Ch. 2016).
12. The previous year, the Delaware Supreme Court for the first time applied the deferential
business judgment standard of review in the context of a controlling shareholder merger, making
shareholder litigation more difficult in that context. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635,
644 (Del. 2014).
13. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(4), 109(b) (West 2017). The legislation codified the
Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp.,
73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013), upholding the validity of a board-adopted forum selection bylaw.
14. Prior to the legislation, corporations had experimented with the adoption of forum
selection bylaws. Joseph Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection
Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 337 (2012). In Boilermakers, the Delaware
Supreme Court upheld the facial validity of such bylaws, and this holding was ratified by the 2015
legislation. 73 A.3d at 934. Notably, however, the legislation prohibits Delaware corporations from
excluding the Delaware courts as a permissible forum. See Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and
the Challenge of Litigation Bylaws, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1637, 1640 (2016) (explaining and analyzing
the scope of the Delaware legislation).
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would not simply shift these cases out of Delaware. This then provided
the foundation for Trulia and its progeny. 15
In this Essay, we explore the effect of these developments on the
shifting dynamics of merger litigation. We focus, in particular, on
disclosure-only settlements and the related phenomenon of
multijurisdictional litigation. We hypothesize that, as many
commentators have long recognized, plaintiffs and their lawyers
respond to litigation incentives. Specifically, we predict that the
increased difficulty of bringing a successful claim for money damages
and the reduced likelihood that plaintiffs’ attorneys will receive a fee
award in the absence of a recovery of money damages will push
plaintiffs’ attorneys to find ways to file and resolve merger litigation
outside of Delaware despite the presence of forum selection clauses. 16
We also expect that plaintiffs’ lawyers will find alternative ways to
bring and prosecute merger-related suits in order to continue to collect
attorneys’ fees.
One such avenue is to file merger litigation in federal court.
Forum selection bylaws prohibit merger litigation from being pursued
in state courts outside of Delaware, but they do not prevent plaintiffs
from bringing federal suits alleging disclosure violations under Rule
14a-9, the federal prohibition against proxy fraud. 17
Another option is collusion between plaintiffs’ counsel and the
defendant corporation. Even in corporations that have adopted a forum
selection bylaw, the board of directors may waive the application of that
bylaw and allow the corporation to be sued in a non-Delaware forum.
This enables the corporation to negotiate a settlement on terms that are
now prohibited in Delaware by the Trulia decision. Along similar lines,
in situations where the plaintiffs can credibly allege that the filing of
their case led to increased disclosures by the defendants that mooted
the litigation, the parties can settle disclosure-only cases on the grounds
of “mootness.” In such cases, defendants can voluntarily compensate
plaintiffs’ counsel through a “mootness fee.”
We test the incidence of these responses in the first wave of
merger cases following the Trulia decision. Our empirical analysis in
this Essay examines a dataset of merger litigation for deals over $100

15. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, How Long Do We Have to Play the “Great Game?,” 100 IOWA
L. REV. BULLETIN 31, 37 (2015) (arguing that forum selection clauses are likely to substantially
diminish multiforum merger litigation).
16. Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 165, 166 (2015).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2017).
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million completed from 2003 through October 2017. 18 We find that
overall levels of merger litigation initially declined but have risen back
as plaintiffs’ attorneys have adapted to the new regime. In 2013, 96% of
all completed deals were challenged in at least one lawsuit. That
number declined to 73% in 2016 but rose to 85% in 2017.
On the other hand, as we predicted, plaintiffs appear, in the
short term at least, to be trying to avoid the effects of the changes in
Delaware law by filing their cases elsewhere. Litigation brought in the
Delaware Chancery Court has declined substantially. Of the deals
completed in 2016, only 34% were challenged in Delaware, while 61%
were challenged in other states and 39% in federal court. During the
first ten months of 2017 the trend accelerated, with only 9% in
Delaware compared to 87% in federal court. 19 The latter number, which
represents a significant increase in the percentage of cases filed in
federal court, seems to be an attempt to avoid the impact of forum
selection bylaws.
We also observe differences in case outcomes. In 2016, 43% of
deal litigation settled compared to 63% in 2014. Within Delaware, only
6% of cases settled in 2016, the lowest rate over the past decade. We
find no evidence to indicate that the quality of these settlements differs
substantially from that in prior years. We also find a substantial
increase in dismissals; in particular, the rate at which cases are
dismissed spiked to 89% in 2017. Finally, we find a rising use of
dismissal combined with the mootness fee. In 2016, 22% of cases were
resolved in this manner, while so far in 2017 this rate has skyrocketed
to 75%—an all-time high. 20 Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees have also declined.
In 2014—the year before Trulia—the median attorneys’ fee was
$500,000. In 2017, it was $280,000.
We find little evidence of collusion. In no cases in our sample
did defendants appear to ignore forum selection clauses in order to
18. We limit our analysis to larger transactions, as do many similar studies, because larger
deals are more likely to attract interest from the plaintiffs’ bar. See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss &
Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class
Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1823 n.87 (2004) (employing similar approach).
19. The percentages do not sum to 100% because of multiple cases in multiple forums.
20. In the past year, the Chancery Court has approved such fees, albeit at a reduced rate. See
In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litig., No. 11263-VCG (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2016) (rejecting mootness
fee request of $275,000 by allowing a smaller fee of $50,000); In re Receptos, Inc. Stockholder Litig.,
No. 11316-CB, slip op. at 76 (Del. Ch. July 21, 2016) (reducing mootness fee from $350,000 to
$100,000, stating that:
[A] lesson to take away from this [is that there] is no right to cover one’s supposed time
and expenses just because you sue on a deal, and plaintiffs should not expect to receive
a fee in the neighborhood of $300,000 for supplemental disclosures in a post-Trulia
world unless some of the supplemental information is material under the standards of
Delaware law).
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avoid the effect of Trulia by negotiating a settlement in another
jurisdiction that included a release. In five cases, however, litigation
was resolved in another state through dismissal and payment of a
mootness fee to plaintiffs’ counsel even though the issuer had a forum
selection bylaw in place requiring that the litigation be pursued in
Delaware.
Our sample represents the first wave of litigation response to
the developments in merger law. As a result, our findings are
necessarily preliminary. Nonetheless, our results document what
commentators have often predicted: litigation practices respond to
changes in the law and, in the short term, plaintiffs’ lawyers will seek
alternate forms of recourse if Delaware law becomes more restrictive.
Because of the time frame that we studied, we cannot evaluate
the long-term consequences of the changes in Delaware law.
Specifically, the extent to which the federal courts and other state
courts will adhere to Trulia and the other components of Delaware
merger law is unclear. We note that at least one federal court has
explicitly followed Trulia and refused to validate a disclosure-only
settlement. 21 In addition, as two of us have noted elsewhere, federal law
contains a variety of safeguards against frivolous litigation that may
frustrate attempts to use federal court litigation as a substitute. 22 As a
result, it seems likely that the shift of deal cases into federal court will
work itself out as federal courts address these cases.
More broadly, our results highlight the responsiveness of
shareholder litigation to changes in the law and venue options.
Plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys will make moves and
countermoves as they seek to shift venues and move to filing alternative
forms of shareholder litigation. For example, barriers in Delaware to
deal litigation appear to have led to an increase in the number of filings
seeking relief under the Delaware appraisal statute.
We also examine claims that Delaware has not done enough to
eradicate frivolous lawsuits using the prism of Type I error (false
positives) and Type II error (false negatives). If Delaware makes its law
less favorable for plaintiffs to reduce the risk of frivolous lawsuits
(lowering Type I error), it risks increasing Type II error by blocking out
valuable cases that address managerial misconduct. Extreme actions to
cut down on strike suits, like fee-shifting bylaws, will inevitably trade
off fewer frivolous cases for fewer good cases. 23
21. In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 725 (7th Cir. 2016).
22. Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 597–98.
23. See, e.g., Albert H. Choi, Fee-Shifting and Shareholder Litigation (Va. Law & Econ.,
Research Paper No. 2016-15, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2840947 [https://perma.cc/Y8FXNCEV] (modeling this trade-off).
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Finally, we revisit the competition between Delaware and other
states to analyze how the new, more restrictive rules will impact it. We
find that other states may seek to attract litigation by offering a more
attractive environment for plaintiffs’ counsel. The greater risk for
Delaware than losing its cases is losing incorporations as a consequence
of its efforts to adopt litigation reforms. 24 We also argue that some
Delaware corporate law stakeholders, especially Delaware lawyers,
may push back against overly stringent standards for shareholder
litigation. Adaptive responses to these regulatory changes push and
pull at Delaware’s equilibrium.
In the end, we counsel caution in responding to the fluid
situation. The dynamic nature of the merger litigation game shows that
the pattern is both adaptive and still a work in progress. The better
choice appears to be to wait and ascertain the full effect of forum
selection clauses and the federal court response to these issues.
In the remainder of the Essay, Part I discusses the problem of
merger litigation and the recent developments, including the Trulia
decision. Part II sets forth our empirical analysis. Part III considers the
implications of our results. A brief conclusion follows.
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MERGER LITIGATION
In recent years, many commentators have argued that merger
litigation is fundamentally broken. 25 Virtually all deals are challenged
through litigation—with the rate of such challenges in deals over $100
million hovering between 94% and 96%. 26 In addition, most large
mergers are challenged in multiple lawsuits filed in different courts. 27
In 2013, the average number of such lawsuits was more than seven per
merger. 28 Lawsuits are brought by a number of different plaintiffs’

24. Commentators have long expressed concern about the prospect that litigants might seek
to avoid the impact of Delaware decisions by filing lawsuits in courts outside of Delaware. See, e.g.,
John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 605, 606 (2012).
25. See, e.g., Marc Wolinsky & Ben Schireson, Deal Litigation Run Amok: Diagnosis and
Prescriptions, 47 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 1, 1 (2014) (arguing that “the system is broken,
that shareholder suits are being filed regardless of the merits, and that shareholder plaintiffs are
imposing a dead weight on society”).
26. Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 558–59; see also In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d
884, 907 (Del. Ch. 2016) (noting the high rate of merger litigations).
27. Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 604–05.
28. Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2013, at 1–2 (Ohio
State Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 236, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2377001
[https://perma.cc/MCJ3-C2AW].
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firms that then compete with each other over control of the case and
receipt of a fee award. 29
There are several legal bases for challenging a merger. 30 Most
merger lawsuits include claims for breach of fiduciary duty, including
allegations that the board failed to adhere to its duty under Revlon to
maximize shareholder value. 31 These claims are commonly linked with
a claim that the merger documents failed to make adequate
disclosure. 32 Plaintiffs may also challenge the disclosures made in a
merger by filing a proxy fraud claim under section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 33 Finally, if the merger involves a
controlling shareholder, a management buy-out, or other conflict of
interest, the plaintiff may allege a violation of the duty of loyalty. 34
Although mergers are subject to frequent challenges, the
benefits from this litigation to the plaintiff class, in many cases, are
limited. To be sure, some merger lawsuits identify serious misconduct
and produce substantial monetary recoveries. 35 In addition, some
lawsuits result in a change in the merger terms, such as a reduction in
the amount of a break-up fee. 36 These decisions have an impact beyond
a single case in that they announce standards of conduct that guide
29. See Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-Forum Shareholder Litigation, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 467,
469 (explaining that counsel “regularly file identical claims in more than one forum and then
compete with each other for position in settling with defendants”). The prospect that class counsel
will engage in a reverse auction in which they agree to cheaply settle a case in order to receive a
fee award has long been recognized as a risk in class action litigation that is not unique to merger
cases. See, e.g., Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 473 (2000)
(describing the problem of a reverse auction).
30. Plaintiffs also have the right to dissent from the merger and seek a judicial determination
of the fair value of their shares under the Delaware appraisal statute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262
(West 2017).
31. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182–83 (Del. 1986).
32. Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 564.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2012).
34. See, e.g., Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644–45 (Del. 2014) (alleging
violation of the duty of loyalty in the context of a controlling stockholder freeze-out merger).
35. See, e.g., In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., No. 9079-VCL, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 223,
at *83 (Aug. 27, 2015) (imposing liability of $148 million for breaches of the duty of loyalty); In re
Activision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 1030 (Del. Ch. 2015) (approving $275
million settlement); In re Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 102 A.3d 205, 224 (Del. Ch. 2014)
(entering judgment against financial advisor for $76 million); see also Joel Edan Friedlander,
Vindicating the Duty of Loyalty: Using Data Points of Successful Stockholder Litigation as a Tool
for Reform, 72 BUS. LAW. 623, 626 (2017) (identifying data points of successful stockholder
litigation and arguing that these data points should inform the discussion of stockholder litigation
reform).
36. These are known as amendment settlements and are viewed as superior to disclosureonly settlements as they offer some substantive changes. See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 576
(“[B]ecause amendments should improve the terms of the merger or the quality of the procedures
used in reaching a final agreement, amendment settlements should increase shareholder voting
in favor of the merger.”).
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participants in future transactions. They may also influence the terms
on which challenges are settled in the absence of a reported judicial
opinion. 37
The vast majority of merger challenges, however, are resolved
through a settlement in which the target company agrees to make
additional disclosures in the proxy statement and not to oppose a
request by plaintiffs’ counsel for a fee award. 38 The settlement also
includes a release of all possible merger-related claims, thereby
insulating the merger from further attack. Although corrective
disclosures can, in theory, provide value to the plaintiff class, they often
do not. 39
A related development is the increase in Delaware appraisal
litigation. 40 Although class actions alleging a breach of fiduciary duty
have traditionally been the dominant litigation strategy, 41 both the
frequency and size of appraisal claims have grown dramatically in the
last several years. 42 Commentators have argued that this trend was
due, in part, to the fact that the appraisal statute mandated that courts
award interest in appraisal cases at a statutory rate that, in recent
years, has substantially exceeded the market rate. 43 The opportunity to
collect the statutory interest rate at relatively low risk has led some to
characterize appraisal litigation as “appraisal arbitrage” and to warn
that the practice is having an adverse effect on merger activity. 44

37. See Friedlander, supra note 35, at 626 (describing opinion in J.L. Schiffman & Co., Inc.
Profit Sharing Tr. v. Standard Indus., Inc., No. 11267, 1993 WL 271441 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1993),
in which the court sought to memorialize the value to plaintiffs of the unopposed settlement of a
shareholder suit).
38. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2015, at 5 (Jan.
14, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the
Economy), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890 [https://perma.cc/C9N2-67MS] (documenting the
limited number of cases that are resolved other than through a disclosure-only settlement).
39. See, e.g., In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 724 (7th Cir. 2016) (“The
type of class action illustrated by this case—the class action that yields fees for class counsel and
nothing for the class—is no better than a racket.”).
40. See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public
Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1553 (2015) (describing a tenfold increase in appraisal
litigation from 2004 to 2013).
41. See Craig Boyd, Appraisal Arbitrage: Closing the Floodgates on Hedge Funds and Activist
Shareholders, 65 KAN. L. REV. 497, 502 (2016) (“Over the past decade, appraisal claims have had
a limited presence in Delaware courts and have been insignificant in terms of Delaware legislative
reform.”).
42. Korsmo & Myers, supra note 40, at 1572–74.
43. See Wei Jiang, Tao Li, Danqing Mei & Randall Thomas, Appraisal: Shareholder Remedy
or Litigation Arbitrage?, 59 J.L. & ECON. 697, 721 (2016) (finding evidence that the surge in
appraisal rights is attributable in part to the high interest rate paid on claims).
44. Boyd, supra note 41, at 522. But see Jiang et al., supra note 43, at 698 (documenting
growth in use of appraisal but defending its importance as a corporate governance remedy).
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The rise in merger litigation led the Delaware legislature in
2016 to make two significant changes to the appraisal statute. First,
the legislature restricted appraisal filings to cases involving a minimum
collective stake of $1 million, or 1% of the outstanding stock of the
company. Second, the statute permitted issuers to reduce their
exposure to the statutory interest rate by tendering some or all of the
merger consideration to plaintiffs before the resolution of the case. 45
The appraisal amendments have been criticized, however, as
insufficient. 46 Moreover, they appear to have done nothing to stop the
flow of appraisal rights cases in Delaware. 47 In 2015, for instance,
thirty-three deals were targeted with fifty-one appraisal petitions. By
comparison, in 2016, forty-eight deals were challenged by seventy-seven
appraisal petitions. Both 2015 and 2016 were record years with respect
to both the number of deals challenged and number of petitions filed.
The Delaware courts recognized the problems with merger
litigation and, in the past several years, they began to take steps both
to reduce the substantive scope of director liability in merger litigation
and the incentives to plaintiffs’ counsel for bringing litigation
challenges. 48 The most recent development with respect to the
substantive scope of director liability was the Delaware Supreme
Court’s 2015 decision in Corwin v. KKR. 49 In Corwin, the court held that
the business judgment rule is the proper standard of review in a postclosing action for damages when the transaction has been approved by
a fully informed majority of disinterested shareholders. The court
expressly noted that the heightened standards of review under cases
45. Boyd, supra note 41, at 508.
46. See Stanley Onyeador, Note, The Chancery Bank of Delaware: Appraisal Arbitrageurs
Expose Need to Further Reform Defective Appraisal Statute, 70 VAND. L. REV. 339 (2017). But see
Jiang et al., supra note 43, at 700 (arguing that statutory changes should mitigate appraisal
litigation problems).
47. Michael Greene, M&A Deal Price Challenges Spiking in Delaware, BLOOMBERG: BNA
(Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.bna.com/ma-deal-price-n73014449766/ [https://perma.cc/7PNQZTPA].
48. The Delaware Supreme Court had previously held that the deferential business judgment
rule rather than the more demanding entire fairness standard could be applied, in certain cases,
to litigation challenges to freeze-out mergers (i.e., mergers where a controlling stockholder
acquires the remaining minority interest). In MFW, the court held that the business judgment rule
was the appropriate standard of review “where the merger is conditioned ab initio upon both the
approval of an independent, adequately-empowered Special Committee that fulfills its duty of care;
and the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders.” Kahn v. M&F
Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014). The court also held in Leal v. Meeks (In re
Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc.), 115 A.3d 1173, 1180 (Del. 2015), that a plaintiff must plead
nonexculpated claims against a defendant director to survive a motion to dismiss, regardless of
the underlying standard of review, and that a board could satisfy its Revlon duties without
conducting a market check in C&J Energy Services v. City of Miami General Employees’ &
Sanitation Employees’ Retirement Trust, 107 A.3d 1049, 1071 (Del. 2014).
49. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 305–06 (Del. 2015).
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such as Revlon and Unocal were only appropriate in actions for
injunctive relief and were “not tools designed with post-closing money
damages claims in mind.” 50 The effect of Corwin was to provide a
streamlined basis for a court facing a claim for damages in a third-party
merger to dismiss the case on the pleadings. 51
At the same time, several decisions expressly questioned the
practice of approving disclosure-only settlements of merger cases,
noting the limited value provided by the corrective disclosures, the
broad releases generated by the settlement, and the absence of an
adversarial process by which to test the adequacy of the settlement
terms. 52 These concerns culminated in Chancellor Bouchard’s January
2016 decision In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation. 53 Trulia focused
specifically on the appropriate legal standard for judicial approval of a
disclosure-only settlement of a lawsuit challenging a merger.
Chancellor Bouchard observed that the courts’ historic practice of
approving disclosure-only settlements of “marginal value” and
awarding plaintiffs’ counsel an attorneys’ fee in such cases was a
component of the “dynamics that have fueled disclosure settlements of
deal litigation.” 54 Consequently, the court announced its intent to
exercise greater vigilance in analyzing the reasonableness of a proposed
disclosure-only settlement. 55 The court explained that
practitioners should expect that disclosure settlements are likely to be met with continued
disfavor in the future unless the supplemental disclosures address a plainly material
misrepresentation or omission, and the subject matter of the proposed release is narrowly
circumscribed to encompass nothing more than disclosure claims and fiduciary duty
claims concerning the sale process, if the record shows that such claims have been
investigated sufficiently. 56

In Trulia, Chancellor Bouchard recognized that plaintiffs could
respond to these doctrinal developments in several ways. One option, if
50. Id. at 312.
51. Subsequent decisions reaffirmed Corwin and applied it to mergers accomplished by
means of a tender offer. See Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 151–52 (Del. 2016) (explaining
that “[w]hen the business judgment rule standard of review is invoked because of a vote, dismissal
is typically the result”); In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 743 (Del. Ch. 2016)
(explaining that “the policy considerations underlying the holding in Corwin do not provide any
basis for distinguishing between a stockholder vote and a tender offer”); In re Zale Corp.
Stockholders Litig., No. 9388-VCP, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 274, at *8 (Oct. 29, 2015) (holding that
“after the merger has been approved by a majority of disinterested stockholders in a fully informed
vote, the standard for finding a breach of the duty of care under BJR is gross negligence”).
52. See, e.g., In re Aruba Networks, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 10765-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 9,
2015); In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 241
(Sept. 17, 2015).
53. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016).
54. Id. at 891, 894.
55. Id. at 898.
56. Id.
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the litigation involved plainly material disclosure deficiencies, was to
seek injunctive relief prior to the closing of the merger. 57 Although the
Delaware courts have been reluctant to provide injunctive relief that
would interfere with the shareholders’ ability to participate in an
economically beneficial transaction, 58 an injunction that is limited to
corrective disclosure does not present that concern. 59
Another option is to dismiss the case on mootness grounds with
the defendants voluntarily agreeing to pay counsel a mootness fee. 60
The extent to which mootness fees can be justified under a lesser
standard than “plainly material” is unclear. 61 In a post-Trulia opinion,
Vice Chancellor Glasscock struggled with this question and ultimately
awarded plaintiffs’ counsel a $50,000 mootness fee, reasoning that a fee
could be justified even if the disclosures were merely “helpful” because
the dismissal did not bind the stockholder class or result in a class-wide
release. 62
A third option, not discussed by the Trulia opinion, is for counsel
to seek to avoid the application of the recent Delaware decisions by
filing in another jurisdiction. 63 As discussed above, plaintiffs already
frequently challenge mergers by filing suit in state courts outside of
Delaware or in federal court.
The extent to which other courts will follow these Delaware
cases is unclear. To the extent that plaintiffs bring fiduciary duty claims
outside of Delaware against Delaware directors, Delaware substantive

57. Id. at 896.
58. See, e.g., In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., No. 7144-VCG, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45,
at *7, *66–73 (Mar. 6, 2012) (refusing to enjoin merger where plaintiffs had demonstrated a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of some claims “because the deal represents a large
premium over market price”).
59. See, e.g., In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 452–53 (Del. Ch. 2002)
(“[A]lthough I recognize that this court rightly hesitates to deny stockholders an opportunity to
accept a tender offer, I believe that the risks of an injunction are outweighed by the need for
adequate disclosure . . . .”).
60. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 897.
61. One report finds that “[p]laintiffs’ lawyers who have sought mootness fees have faced
mixed but mostly negative results.” Keenan Lynch & Edward Micheletti, Key Developments in
Delaware Corporation Law in 2016, JDSUPRA (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/key-developments-in-delaware-43114/ [https://perma.cc/VQX4-24WK] (reporting “the
court only granted amounts of $50,000 and $100,000, if any at all”).
62. In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litig., No. 11263-VCG, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117, at *10,
*15 (Aug. 4, 2016).
63. See, e.g., Armour et al., supra note 24, at 607 (presenting statistics showing that an
increasing percentage of cases involving Delaware corporations are being litigated outside of
Delaware); Ted Mirvis, Anywhere but Chancery: Ted Mirvis Sounds an Alarm and Suggests Some
Solutions, M&A J., May 2007, at 17, 17 (reporting statistics indicating that it had become “twice
as likely as it was previous that the litigation will be brought and litigated outside of Delaware”).
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law, such as Corwin, should govern those claims. 64 On the other hand,
the nonadversarial context of a proposed settlement and request for
attorneys’ fees may dissuade a non-Delaware court from rejecting the
proposed settlement on the grounds that the case might have been
dismissed pursuant to Corwin. Similarly, courts in other states may not
be willing to follow Trulia in evaluating the reasonableness of the
settlement terms. 65
Indeed, a New York court recently refused to apply Trulia to a
Delaware corporation, instead imposing an easier to meet standard for
approval of disclosure-only settlements. 66 In Gordon v. Verizon
Communications, Inc., 67 the New York appellate court rejected the
Trulia test and instead applied its own standard to approve a proposed
settlement of litigation challenging the 2013 acquisition by Verizon for
$130 billion of a 45% stake in Verizon Wireless held by Vodafone. The
settlement required additional disclosure and allowed for the payment
of an attorneys’ fee of $2 million. Although the lower court concluded
that the additional disclosure was “unnecessary surplusage” and
refused to award the requested fee, the appellate court reversed. 68
Applying its own test instead of Trulia, even though Verizon Wireless
was a Delaware company, the court examined whether the proposed
settlement was in the best interest of “shareholders” and the class as
well as the “corporation.” 69 The court found that although the disclosure
provided “some . . . albeit minimal” benefit to the company, a settlement
avoided “having to incur the additional legal fees and expenses of a

64. See, e.g., In re Crown Castle Int’l Corp., 247 S.W.3d 349, 352–53 (Tex. App. 2008) (holding
that Delaware substantive corporate law, including pleading requirements that Delaware courts
had characterized as substantive, applied to corporations incorporated in Delaware); see also
Quinn v. Knight, No. 3:16-cv-610, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151346, at *10 (E.D. Va. Nov. 1, 2016)
(citing to Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015), in the context of a Virginia
corporation).
65. See Myers, supra note 29, at 471 (explaining that other state courts may “compete to offer
the most shareholder-friendly interpretations of Delaware law or the most attractive procedures
for pressing claims”).
66. Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 148 A.D.3d 146, 161–62, 164 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)
(approving a $2 million disclosure settlement and promulgating a multifactor test for consideration
of such settlements). Prior to the Gordon decision, several New York trial courts had refused to
approve disclosure-only settlements. See, e.g., In re Allied Healthcare S’holder Litig., No.
652188/2011, 2015 WL 6499467, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2015); City Trading Fund v. Nye, No.
651668/2014, 2015 WL 93894, at *19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 7, 2015).
67. 148 A.D.3d at 149, 161–62.
68. Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 653084/13, 2014 WL 7250212, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 19, 2014), rev’d, 148 A.D.3d 146 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
69. Gordon, 148 A.D.3d at 159.
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trial.” 70 The court also considered the time and labor involved in the
action and awarded the full $2 million fee to the attorneys. 71
Similarly, a Nevada attorney has written that Nevada offers
issuers the opportunity to resolve strike suits “efficiently and
effectively” by permitting these cases to be resolved through the
traditional disclosure-only settlement coupled with a release and fee
award, citing a number of decisions approving such settlements and, in
at least one case, the award of a substantial attorneys’ fee. 72 Whether
other courts will follow these decisions is unclear. Indeed, even prior to
Trulia, Texas had adopted another method of discouraging disclosureonly settlements. 73
In federal court, Judge Posner explicitly endorsed the Trulia
standard for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Walgreen Co.
Stockholder Litigation. 74 Although Delaware law does not govern the
substance of federal proxy fraud claims, the scope of such claims is
focused on disclosure rather than substantive fairness and is therefore
more limited than traditional merger litigation. 75 In addition, the
federal securities laws contain a number of safeguards to permit early
dismissal of nonmeritorious claims. 76
Plaintiffs’ ability to avoid the impact of the Delaware decisions
by filing in courts outside of Delaware will depend on another
complication—the increasing adoption of forum selection provisions. 77
Forum selection provisions enable a corporation to designate the
70. Id. at 159–61.
71. It is unclear how broadly the holding of Gordon will be applied. In a recent New York
case, City Trading Fund v. Nye, No. 651668/2014, 2018 WL 792283 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 2018), a
New York lower court interpreted Gordon’s “some benefit” standard to be equivalent to the
standard for a mootness fee in Delaware and refused to approve a settlement that included “the
payment of counsel fees in exchange for worthless supplemental disclosures.” Id. at *19.
72. Jeffrey S. Rugg, Strike Suit Certainty Remains the Status Quo in Nevada, LAW360 (Aug.
11, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/689917/strike-suit-certainty-remains-the-status-quoin-nevada [https://perma.cc/VA3Q-3MAV].
73. Texas law prohibits courts from awarding attorneys’ fees in a case in which there is no
monetary recovery for the plaintiff class. Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 613. Although the provision
was adopted to address coupon settlements in consumer class actions, a Texas appellate court
applied it to merger litigation. Kazman v. Frontier Oil Corp., 398 S.W.3d 377, 387 (Tex. App. 2013).
74. 832 F.3d 718, 725 (7th Cir. 2016).
75. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1977) (holding that “the fairness
of the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the [federal] statute”).
76. See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 613 (describing procedural safeguards including
heightened pleading standard and discovery stay).
77. Some issuers also responded to the concerns about excessive litigation by adopting feeshifting bylaws, which impose liability for the corporation’s attorneys’ fees on unsuccessful
plaintiffs. Although the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the validity of fee-shifting bylaws in ATP
Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 557 (Del. 2014), the Delaware legislature
subsequently amended the statute to prohibit both fee-shifting bylaws and charter provisions. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b) (West 2017).
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jurisdiction in which shareholder suits must be filed; for Delaware
corporations, that jurisdiction is typically Delaware. 78 Vice Chancellor
Laster first suggested approval of forum selection charter provisions in
2010. 79 For some years, the validity of such provisions was
questionable. 80 In 2013, however, then-Chancellor Strine upheld their
validity in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp. 81
The Delaware legislature subsequently ratified his decision and
explicitly authorized Delaware corporations to adopt both forum
selection charter and bylaw provisions. 82
As of August 2014, 746 U.S. public companies had adopted
forum selection provisions. 83 In theory, such provisions should prevent
plaintiffs from evading the impact of the recent Delaware merger cases
by filing in another jurisdiction. The typical forum selection provision,
however, is not mandatory—the board has the authority to waive its
application. 84 As a result, it is possible even for issuers with a forum
selection provision to be sued and settle litigation outside of Delaware
if the board agrees to that action.
What has been the initial impact of these developments on
Delaware merger litigation? The situation is clearly still a work in
progress, as judges and litigants work through the implications of the
new legal climate. As one commentator noted: “It remains to be seen
whether stockholder plaintiffs will experiment with new strategies and
recalibrate, or if the trends of 2016 will lead to permanent changes in
deal litigation practice.” 85 Although it is too early to evaluate the longterm effects, we present in the next Part some preliminary statistics.

78. The 2015 legislation requires that forum selection provisions for Delaware corporations
designate a Delaware forum, but that designation need not be exclusive. §§ 102(f), 109(b).
79. See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[I]f boards of
directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and valuepromoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with charter
provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”).
80. Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum
Shareholder Litigation 10 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 295/2015, 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2624951 [https://perma.cc/MVD3-9489].
81. 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
82. §§ 102(f), 109(b).
83. Romano & Sanga, supra note 80, at 2.
84. See Paul J. Collins & Michael J. Kahn, Deal Litigation After “Trulia,” DEL. BUS. CT.
INSIDER (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Collins-Kahn-DealLitigation-After-Trulia-DBCI-4-27-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/V55Z-ZY9U] (observing that “at least
some companies [are waiving the application of a forum selection bylaw] to obtain the certainty
associated with settlement”).
85. Lynch & Micheletti, supra note 61.
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II. DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Data Set
Our sample contains all the transactions listed in the FactSet
MergerMetrics 86 database and announced from 2003 through 2017 that
meet the following criteria: (1) the target is a U.S. firm publicly traded
on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, or
NASDAQ; (2) the transaction size is at least $100 million; (3) the offer
price is at least five dollars per share; (4) a merger agreement is signed
and publicly disclosed through a filing with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”); and (5) the transaction has been
completed as of October 20, 2017. This constitutes 2,101 unique deals.
We then review by hand merger proxy statements and tender
offer documents filed with the SEC to determine if litigation is brought
with respect to the transaction. We document all class action litigation
brought in connection with a merger, finding that litigation is brought
in 1,355 transactions, or 64% of our sample. For litigation outcomes,
attorneys’ fees, and settlement terms, we review public filings and
obtain actual court filings. Court filings are obtained directly from the
court, from public filings on the LexisNexis File and Serve Database, or
Bloomberg Law and are also reviewed by hand. 87
B. Empirical Analysis
We begin by setting forth in Chart 1 the total number of deals
and associated litigation completed in each year over our sample period
from 2003 to 2017. 88 The sample includes all mergers with an aggregate
value exceeding $100 million wherever the target corporation is
incorporated.

86. More information about the database can be found at Bifurcated Termination Fees and
Common Termination Events, FACTSET MERGERS (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.mergermetrics.com
[http://perma.cc/7U34-82CR].
87. The data collection here is taken in part from a database compiled for a prior study by
two of the coauthors. See Cain & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 16, at 487 (stating that the court
filings are obtained directly from the court and from public filings on the LexisNexis File and Serve
Database or on Bloomberg Law and are also reviewed by hand).
88. This chart records deals by date of completion. A transaction announced in 2014 and
completed in 2015 would be marked in this chart as a 2015 transaction; the remaining tables follow
the same convention. The numbers for 2017 are annualized figures.
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CHART 1: LITIGATION RATES BY DEAL COMPLETION
YEAR
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Chart 1 also sets forth the percentage of completed deals
attracting litigation for each year. The number of completed deals in
our sample reached a high point of 287 in 2007, falling to 58 in 2009. In
2015 and 2016, the number of completed deals was 142 and 166,
respectively, a slight rise from 2010 to 2014, during which time the
number of completed deals ranged from 117 to 134 deals. Litigation
rates have fluctuated substantially over our sample period. From 2003
to 2008, litigation challenges ranged from 33% of completed deals (2004)
to 43% of completed deals (2008). There was a sharp rise in the
litigation rate in 2009 to 76% of completed deals. This rise continued in
2010 when 90% of completed deals attracted litigation.
Litigation then peaked in 2013 at an astounding rate of 96% of
all completed deals. In 2015, the litigation rate was 89%, but the rate
was 92% for deals announced in the first half of 2015 and 85% in the
second half of 2015 as the Delaware courts began to crack down on
disclosure-only settlements. In 2016, the litigation rate fell to 73% of all
completed deals, below the 2009 rate, and rose slightly to 85% during
the first ten months of 2017.
The rise in overall litigation rates was accompanied by a sharp
rise in multijurisdictional litigation. Table 1 sets forth the percentage
of cases filed in Delaware, other states, and the federal courts during
our sample period. The final column reports the percentage of cases
filed in more than one jurisdiction.
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TABLE 1: FILINGS BY DEAL COMPLETION YEAR

Deals

% with
Litigation % Delaware*

% Other
States*

% Filed in
Multiple
% Federal* Jurisdictions

2003

41

34%

7%

100%

7%

7%

2004

140

33%

43%

78%

0%

33%

2005

159

37%

39%

66%

7%

14%

2006

210

39%

21%

82%

12%

17%

2007

287

42%

28%

86%

13%

35%

2008

152

43%

23%

92%

21%

31%

2009

58

76%

34%

98%

20%

50%

2010

134

90%

49%

88%

26%

53%

2011

130

92%

51%

88%

39%

63%

2012

118

90%

56%

88%

34%

69%

2013

120

96%

52%

83%

32%

61%

2014

117

91%

55%

73%

15%

41%

2015

142

89%

60%

51%

20%

31%

2016

166

73%

34%

61%

39%

33%

2017

127

85%

9%

18%

87%

22%

Total

2,101

64%

41%

74%

28%

42%

* Note: Percentages sum to > 100% each year due to multijurisdictional filings.

The percentages of filings in Delaware, other states, and the
federal courts do not sum to 100% because of the fact that a single deal
can be challenged by a lawsuit in Delaware, a lawsuit in another state,
and a lawsuit in federal court. However, these numbers show that the
number of filings in Delaware has fluctuated substantially. Most
notably, filings in Delaware fell by almost 50% in 2016 and are down
below 10% during the first ten months of 2017. In 2006, 21% of
completed deals with litigation had a suit brought in Delaware, while
82% of such deals had filings in other states and 12% had a federal
complaint brought. The fall in Delaware filings from 2006 through 2008
led to some assertions that plaintiffs’ lawyers were filing suit out of
Delaware in order to seek better outcomes and that Delaware was
“losing its cases.” 89 As litigation rates increased starting in 2009, cases
migrated back to Delaware, however. Delaware filings peaked in 2015,

89. See Armour et al., supra note 24 (finding that in a period from 1994 to 2010, Delaware
courts were losing market share in lawsuits).
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when 60% of completed deals had a Delaware filing, compared with a
rate of other state filings of 51%. 90
The 2016–2017 filing numbers show the immediate impact of
Trulia and its cohort. In addition to the fact that 2016 filings in
Delaware are half the 2015 number, other state filings have increased
from 51% to 61%. The most significant shift in filings is in federal court,
which increased from 20% of filings in 2015 to 87% of filings in 2017—
by far the highest percentage rate for federal filings in our sample
period. If this trend continues, merger litigation seems likely to become
a matter largely for the federal courts.
In Table 2 we further explore the effects of the Trulia decision
and its cohort by examining litigation settlements over our sample
period. The first column represents the total number of deals with
litigation for which we located data on the case outcome (settled or
dismissed).

90. Not all firms in our sample are Delaware incorporated or headquartered, and so the
number of Delaware filings can never reach 100%. Instead, the number of Delaware-incorporated
or Delaware-headquartered targets is 65% of the sample, and so the 2015 rate is near the
maximum litigation rate for Delaware.
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TABLE 2: LITIGATION OUTCOMES BY DEAL COMPLETION YEAR

Deals with
Litigation*

Settled

Dismissed

% of
Settlements
Settlement Mootness
that are
Rejected** Fees*** Disclosure-Only

2003

11

55%

45%

0

0%

83%

2004

44

66%

34%

0

0%

41%

2005

56

54%

46%

1

0%

63%

2006

78

71%

29%

0

0%

58%

2007

109

68%

32%

0

0%

68%

2008

65

69%

31%

0

0%

82%

2009

41

73%

27%

0

0%

90%

2010

111

82%

18%

0

0%

78%

2011

110

80%

20%

0

0%

69%

2012

100

78%

22%

1

1%

85%

2013

109

77%

23%

1

0%

76%

2014

104

63%

38%

2

3%

74%

2015

117

45%

55%

2

14%

85%

2016

97

43%

57%

1

22%

98%

2017
91
11%
89%
0
75%
90%
* Total number of deals with litigation for which data on the case outcome (settled or dismissed)
is available.
** Subset of dismissals. Includes effective rejections due to out-of-court mootness fee
settlements.
*** Percentage of all cases. Subset of dismissals.

Settlement numbers lag filings since litigation can be time
consuming and span years before a settlement or disposition occurs. In
particular, trials or settlements providing money damages often occur
several years after the initial filing. As a result, these outcomes may be
underrepresented in our outcomes for recent deals. Nonetheless, the
effects of Trulia and other decisions that have affected the ability to
settle cases for a disclosure-only outcome are clear. The rate of
dismissals has already risen sharply in 2017 to an astounding 89% of
all cases.
The rise of the mootness fee is also documented in Table 2.
Litigation outcomes resulting in the payment of a mootness fee are near
0% of cases prior to 2014, but in the wake of Trulia these cases became
more significant. They comprised 14% of cases in 2015 and rose to 75%
of cases by 2017. The payment of mootness fees for cases from 2015 and
2016 can be largely explained as payment made to plaintiffs’ lawyers
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abandoning already existing settlements that were negotiated prior to
Trulia. However, in late 2016 and 2017 there were very significant
numbers of mootness fee payments and accompanying case dismissals.
Accordingly this appears to be an adaptive litigation strategy of
plaintiffs. 91
A final development related to Table 2 is the decline of the
amendment settlement, a settlement that changes the terms of the
agreement. 92 In 2016 there were only 2% of amendment settlements
compared to 24% of settlements for deals completed in 2013. It may be
the case that, like monetary settlements, settlements that involve an
amendment to the merger terms are lagged and will not show up for
transactions completed in 2015–2017 until future years, although this
seems unlikely as the deals at issue have already been completed (and
many cases have been dismissed). We asked a number of prominent
M&A lawyers about the reasons for this development. They uniformly
attributed the decrease to better drafting by transaction lawyers and
the lack of extreme terms existent in prior years which justified such a
settlement, an explanation that we have no way to test with our current
data. Notably, however, the parties do not appear to be seeking to evade
the effect of Trulia by shifting from disclosure-only settlements to
amendment settlements, a trend that some had predicted would occur
if Delaware courts limited their willingness to approve disclosure-only
settlements. 93
In Table 3 we examine the effect of Trulia on attorneys’ fees in
merger litigation.

91. See also Richard L. Renck, Court of Chancery Critically Reviewing “Mootness” Fee
Applications,
LEXOLOGY
(Aug.
10,
2016),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=29b6aab8-a7ab-498f-9eb7-22e5f2f2a162
[https://perma.cc/U46V-Z4V9] (describing recent decisions evaluating mootness fee applications).
92. See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 576 (describing amendment settlements).
93. See id. at 610 (discussing this possibility).
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TABLE 3: MEDIAN ATTORNEYS’ FEES BY DEAL COMPLETION YEAR
AND LITIGATION OUTCOME (IN THOUSANDS)
# of
NonZero
Fees

All NonZero
Fees

Nondisclosure
Settlement

DisclosureOnly
Settlement

Mootness
Fee

2003

4

$425

$450

$499**

N/A

2004

25

$785

$1,050

$350

N/A

2005

30

$400

$588

$395

N/A

2006

52

$505

$1,118

$435

N/A

2007

68

$643

$2,925

$525

N/A

2008

41

$500

$893

$485

N/A

2009

29

$575

$3,050

$575

N/A

2010

89

$600

$1,375

$531

N/A

2011

78

$600

$1,750

$500

N/A

2012

73

$500

$1,940

$450

$4,000*

2013

57

$490

$2,400

$450

N/A

2014

49

$500

$900

$435

$450

2015

54

$373

$825

$400

$200

2016

20

$263

N/A

$320

$238

2017
11
$280
N/A
$300
$265
* Note: $4 million mootness fee in 2012 for Ancestry.com.
** Note: Disclosure-only fees in 2003 are higher than nondisclosure settlement fees.

The first two columns of Table 3 report median attorneys’ fees
for all settlements by year of deal completion. Again, because of a lag in
consideration settlements, figures are lower for immediate years.
However, median attorneys’ fees in disclosure-only settlements decline
from a high of $575,000 in 2009, to $300,000 in 2017. The drop may be
attributable to judges viewing disclosure-only settlements as providing
lower value to the shareholders in the wake of Trulia and its progeny.
The final column of Table 3 reports mootness fees. The $4 million
fee for a deal completed in 2012 is an outlier, reflecting a large
settlement in the Ancestry.com case. 94 But for 2016 and 2017, median
94. In re Ancestry.com S’holder Litig., No. 7988-CS, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 294 (Nov. 27, 2012).
Ancestry.com was not a typical litigation case; it involved a don’t ask/don’t waive standstill and
was one of the first decisions to challenge this type of arrangement. Accordingly, the fee was
proportionately higher and an outlier. See Brian M. Lutz & Jefferson E. Bell, Chancery Court
Provides Guidance on ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive’ Standstill Provisions, DEL. BUS. CT. INSIDER (Jan.
16,
2013),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/LutzBellChanceryCourtProvidesGuidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8W3-54VB] (describing early cases
evaluating the propriety of don’t ask/don’t waive provisions).
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mootness fees were $238,000 and $265,000, respectively. These
numbers are below the medians for disclosure-only settlements and it
is questionable whether they are sufficient to sustain a litigation
practice in this area.
Table 4 further analyzes how the Trulia change has affected
Delaware litigation.
TABLE 4: DELAWARE CASES AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES BY DEAL
COMPLETION YEAR
Attorneys’ Fees ($k)
% Cases Going
to DE

Mean

Median

Median Attorneys’
Fees ($k) for
Disclosure-Only

2003

0%

N/A

N/A

N/A

2004

44%

$1,724

$725

$331

2005

52%

$602

$400

$353

2006

16%

$410

$330

$328

2007

43%

$2,698

$530

$415

2008

28%

$1,040

$850

$750

2009

48%

$1,627

$550

$500

2010

49%

$1,739

$710

$525

2011

58%

$3,098

$600

$400

2012

41%

$1,797

$475

$440

2013

46%

$3,165

$450

$414

2014

55%

$749

$473

$330

2015

41%

$1,337

$350

$315

2016

10%

N/A

N/A

N/A

2017

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Trulia’s consequences are reflected in the first column, which
records those cases that are settled in Delaware as a percentage of deals
involving Delaware-incorporated target corporations for which
litigation is brought and can potentially be brought in Delaware. This
drops to 10% in 2016 from 55% in 2014 and 41% in 2015. This drop
documents that plaintiffs’ attorneys are avoiding Delaware for their
settlements and dispositive litigation.
In Table 4, we also denote changes in aggregate attorneys’ fees
over the years. The findings in Table 4 are consistent with a prior paper
by Cain and Davidoff which finds that overall, Delaware awards higher
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attorneys’ fees and dismisses more cases than other states, perhaps to
compensate for this dismissal rate. 95 This is reflected in Table 4, as
median fees for disclosure-only cases declined from $440,000 to
$315,000 between 2012 and 2015. Figures for 2016 and 2017 are
incomplete due to the lack of observations in which attorneys’ fees have
been awarded because of the lag in time between such settlements and
fee awards.
Table 5 examines in more detail the use of federal courts as an
alternative forum to Delaware.
TABLE 5: PERCENTAGE OF CASES GOING TO FEDERAL
COURTS BY DEAL COMPLETION YEAR
# of Federal
Settlements

% of All Settled
Cases in
Federal Courts

% of Mootness
Fees Paid in
Federal Courts

Nondisclosure
Settlements

2003

0

0%

N/A

N/A

2004

0

0%

N/A

N/A

2005

2

6%

N/A

50%

2006

3

6%

N/A

0%

2007

0

0%

N/A

N/A

2008

0

0%

N/A

N/A

2009

0

0%

N/A

N/A

2010

3

3%

N/A

33%

2011

1

1%

N/A

100%

2012

6

8%

N/A

33%

2013

6

8%

N/A

17%

2014

5

8%

0%

20%

2015

10

18%

0%

0%

2016

14

32%

71%

0%

2017

4

44%

100%

0%

Total

54

7%

90%

13%

Table 5 shows a substantial uptick in cases settled in federal
courts. In unreported figures we also note that 2015 saw 25 federal
lawsuits, 2016 saw 47, and 2017 is on track to see 113 federal lawsuits
if the trend during the first ten months continues throughout the year.
Accompanying that trend, Table 5 shows significant increases in the
percentages of all settled cases that are in federal court. Cases settled
95. Cain & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 16, at 469.
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in federal court represented 0% of cases resolved in 2009. In contrast,
in 2017, 44% of all settlements were in federal court.
Table 5 also documents that the primary driver of the federal
court shift is a rise in mootness fee payments. In 2017, all mootness fee
payments were in federal court cases. None of the federal court cases
settled in 2015 through 2017 were nondisclosure settlements, meaning
that all of these additional federal settlements were disclosure ones.
These statistics are not surprising; filings in federal court must
generally allege a disclosure violation as a basis for jurisdiction, and a
federal court that rejects a disclosure claim need not exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over any state law fiduciary duty claims.
Therefore, we would expect to see federal court litigation focus
primarily on disclosure issues. Two of us argued in another article that
this focus is appropriate because federal law has developed a specialized
jurisprudence for addressing disclosure claims. 96 The federal courts’
expertise in this area suggests that they will be able to work through
these cases proficiently.
The question is whether federal courts will be more receptive to
disclosure claims, disclosure-only settlements, and mootness fee
payments than the Delaware state courts. At least two federal courts
have adopted the reasoning of the Trulia decision. 97 If other federal
courts follow these decisions, we would expect to see the rate of federal
court filings decline in the future. 98
Table 5 also allows us to explore, in a preliminary fashion, the
possibility that plaintiffs’ lawyers and defendants are deliberately
colluding to settle suits outside of Delaware. By collusion, we mean
cases in which an issuer with a Delaware forum selection provision is
sued in another state court and the board waives or otherwise fails to
invoke the forum selection provision and instead settles the case. To
explore this possibility, we examine 2016 announced deals with
litigation completed by February 2017. The issuers in 59.32% of these
cases (n=35) have forum selection clauses that select Delaware as the
exclusive forum for state litigation. The issuers in 11.9% of these cases
(n=7) have forum selection clauses that name a jurisdiction other than

96. Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 596–98.
97. See In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 725 (7th Cir. 2016); Bushansky
v. Remy Int’l, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 3d 742, 752–53 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (denying request for over $400,000
in attorneys’ fees and applying the Trulia standard); see also supra note 73 and accompanying
text.
98. As this Essay goes to press, we are collecting data on additional federal court filings and
resolutions. Our early results suggest a substantial increase in the number of cases that are
dismissed as moot and that result in the payment of a mootness fee to plaintiffs’ counsel. We intend
to document this result and discuss its implications in a subsequent article.
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Delaware. Of these cases, four were settled in a forum not specified by
the forum selection clause, but all four cases involved federal court
litigation which is permitted by all forum selection clauses. Notably, in
no case was a Delaware forum selection clause ignored to reach a state
court settlement.
We note, however, that in five cases from this time period in
2016 involving litigation filed outside of Delaware against an issuer
that had a Delaware forum selection clause, a mootness fee was paid to
plaintiffs’ counsel. The payment of a mootness fee does not directly
evade Trulia; indeed, Delaware judges have approved the payment of
mootness fees in post-Trulia cases. Moreover, five cases are not a trend,
but Table 5 also reveals that in 2016 71% of all mootness fees involved
cases litigated in federal courts. This number rose to 100% in 2017.
These cases thus suggest that continued scrutiny of litigation outside
Delaware is required to determine the extent to which this practice
provides a viable way for plaintiffs’ counsel to collect fees in weak
merger cases.
In Table 6, we look at the number of suits filed in 2015, 2016,
and 2017 for firms that are either headquartered or incorporated in
Delaware.
TABLE 6: MEAN NUMBER OF SUITS FILED (2015–2017)
Mean #
Suits, for
Filings in:

DE
Only

DE+
Fed

DE+Fed
+Other
State

DE+
Other
State

Fed

Other
State

Overall

2015

3.7

4.5

9.8

4.9

3.0

3.0

4.3

[N]

47

6

4

16

1

7

83

2016

2.4

5.0

6.0

3.9

2.3

2.3

2.7

[N]

25

5

2

9

13

18

82

2017

2.7

3.3

7.0

N/A

2.5

1.3

2.7

[N]

3

6

1

0

55

3

71

Average number of suits filed, by venue and deal completion year.
Sample includes only Delaware-incorporated (or headquartered, but not both) firms.

The number of suits filed is a good measure of plaintiffs’
attorneys’ belief in their ability to bring cases that are sufficiently
successful to warrant a reasonable fee award, either on the merits or
through a settlement. Historically, the number of suits filed is also a
good measure of law firm interest in merger litigation. The number of
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lawsuits peaked in 2011 with a mean of 5.8 suits filed per case involving
a Delaware firm. Table 6 shows a shift in plaintiffs’ lawyers’ suit rate
and likely their belief in the prospects for a successful merger litigation
suit. The overall average number of suits per transaction with litigation
for all jurisdictions dropped from 4.3 in 2015 to 2.7 in 2017. Delawareonly suits dropped from an average of 3.7 suits to 2.7 suits per
completed deal. Meanwhile, in multijurisdictional litigation involving
Delaware and federal court, the number rose from 4.5 to 5.0 suits in
2016. This rise further reflects the shift to federal court evidenced in
other tables and is likely attributable to plaintiffs’ lawyers’ belief that
they are more likely to get a disclosure-only settlement approved in
these jurisdictions. It appears also that forum selection clauses are
limiting litigation.
Ultimately, our findings reveal a significant shift in merger
litigation practice post-Trulia. There are fewer suits brought,
particularly in Delaware. There is an outflow of filings from Delaware
towards federal court to avoid forum selection clauses and Trulia. There
is a substantial rise in the percentage of cases with mootness fee
awards, but an overall reduction in the size of attorneys’ fee awards.
There also appear to be higher dismissal rates for cases generally. In
summary, Trulia and other recent changes in Delaware law have
brought a tidal wave of change to the merger litigation industry.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF OUR FINDINGS
A. Litigation Practices Are Responsive to Changes in the Law
Representative shareholder litigation is shaped by two
important characteristics: (1) shareholders’ power to sue is based on
multiple sources of substantive legal rules; and (2) representative
litigation inevitably involves self-appointed agents acting for the
investor group. 99 One result of these forces’ interaction is that the
importance of different venues for bringing these cases changes over
time, and the relative strength of different forms of shareholder
litigation is dynamic as well. 100 If one avenue for vindicating investor
rights shuts down, entrepreneurial agents in the plaintiffs’ bar will seek

99. Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative Shareholder Suits
and Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1753, 1755 (2012).
100. See Hillary A. Sale & Robert B. Thompson, Market Intermediation, Publicness, and
Securities Class Actions, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 487 (2015) (discussing the evolution of securities
fraud litigation to enforce state law fiduciary principles).
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others, while defendants’ attorneys will in turn react to those changes
in their own way. 101
1. Deal Litigation Moves to Other Jurisdictions
Our results demonstrate that, as expected, plaintiffs’ attorneys
respond to litigation incentives that affect deal litigation. When
Delaware law changed to reduce the likelihood of success in M&A cases,
plaintiffs’ counsel reacted by filing fewer deal cases in Delaware. When
Delaware law reduced the size of the expected attorneys’ fee awards in
these cases, plaintiffs’ counsel again responded by filing fewer deal
cases in Delaware. At least in the short run, the efforts by Delaware
courts to reduce the volume of litigation have been successful—these
trends are particularly apparent in Delaware, with both filing rates and
settlement rates dropping in 2016 and 2017.
The changes in Delaware have had some spillover effects as well.
One practical response to multiforum litigation is for a Delaware
company to adopt a forum selection bylaw choosing Delaware as the
appropriate forum. Companies are incentivized to make this choice in
order to limit litigation and appear to be doing so at significant rates.
Forum selection bylaws have funneled litigation that might otherwise
have been filed elsewhere into the Delaware courts. They have also
discouraged plaintiffs’ counsel from bringing cases outside Delaware,
since plaintiffs’ lawyers do not want to engage in costly and generally
fruitless litigation over the validity of forum selection bylaws.
The ability of plaintiffs to avoid Trulia may be limited still more
by the continued adoption and use of these forum selection provisions.
When Trulia is combined with the widespread adoption of forum
selection clauses, it is likely to leave the merger litigation venue choice
as between Delaware and federal court.
The substantive impact of Trulia has not been confined to
Delaware either. Some courts outside of Delaware are looking more
closely at disclosure-only settlements and dismissing more of them. 102
Thus, overall merger litigation levels are down, and plaintiffs’ success
rates in these cases seem to be declining.
Plaintiffs’ law firms are adjusting to this new reality. A
significant number of merger lawsuits that these firms might once have
filed as deal litigation in Delaware have instead been initiated in
federal court or to a lesser extent in other states’ courts. In federal
101. See Cain & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 16, at 487–96 (empirically documenting the
actions and reactions of plaintiffs’ attorneys to shifting legal standards).
102. See supra notes 66–73, 76 and accompanying text.
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courts, these cases are brought as Rule 14a-9 disclosure cases. For
corporations without forum selection bylaws, plaintiffs can file deal
litigation in the state court of the state where the target corporation is
headquartered.
As plaintiffs have adjusted their tactics, so have defendants. It
has become common for defendants’ counsel to seek to dismiss deal
litigation, and the number of dismissed cases has risen sharply. The
most worrisome development to date is the sharp increase in federal
court cases that are being litigated as mootness cases. 103 Although these
cases are being dismissed without a release, reflecting the likelihood
that they are largely nuisance suits, they appear to be generating the
payment of mootness settlement fees, creating an incentive for
plaintiffs’ lawyers to continue to file them. These cases appear to
indicate that plaintiffs’ counsel may be extracting rents by seeking low
cost payments to “go away.” Mootness fee payments thus likely warrant
a more thoughtful response by the federal courts. 104
If Delaware is trying to reduce the amount of deal litigation,
these adjustments by the lawyers involved in them may make
Delaware’s task more difficult. For example, if non-Delaware courts
prove, in the long run, to be more receptive forums, either because they
do not follow Delaware’s restrictions on the scope of merger duties or
because they approve settlements and fee awards more liberally, then
Delaware’s ability to curtail the amount of merger litigation will be
limited.
The full effect of forum selection provisions remains unclear,
however. Although the number of issuers adopting forum selection
clauses is growing, to date, many companies have not adopted them. In
addition, even those issuers that adopt a forum selection provision may
waive its application in order to enter into a settlement on terms that
would not have been permitted by a Delaware court. We find no
evidence of this behavior in our sample. Indeed, there are a number of
specific instances where companies have successfully brought motions
to dismiss litigation based on these clauses. 105 Nonetheless, it is far too
soon to reject this possibility.

103. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
104. We plan to provide details on the increase in mootness settlements and outline a potential
federal court response in a subsequent article.
105. See, e.g., Petit-Frere v. Office Depot, Inc., No. 502015, 2015 WL 10521805 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
May 15, 2015) (upholding forum selection bylaw of a Delaware corporation).
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2. Plaintiffs Shift Resources into Other Forms of Litigation
If the barriers to deal litigation grow, we would expect to see the
plaintiffs’ bar shift more resources into other forms of shareholder
litigation. 106 Many of the same plaintiffs’ law firms that file deal
litigation also are major players in bringing derivative lawsuits and
federal securities class actions. From the plaintiffs’ perspective, there
is little reason to think that corporate misconduct is going to disappear,
so investors will continue to seek legal avenues to redress it. If deal
litigation is no longer a viable way to address wrongdoing, these firms
will find alternative forms of shareholder litigation.
The desire of shareholders and their lawyers to seek viable legal
alternatives to traditional merger litigation is a plausible explanation
for the significant increase in appraisal filings in Delaware in 2016.
This increase occurred against the backdrop of the recent legislative
changes to the appraisal statute that defendants’ law firms pushed for
aggressively. 107 These reforms eliminated cases where the claims made
totaled less than $1 million and also gave defendants the option of
distributing the merger consideration to claimants as a method of
cutting off prejudgment interest accruals. In both instances, the
winning argument for reforms was to cut back on strike suits using the
appraisal statute. 108
While these reforms addressed some of the underlying motives
for the earlier upsurge in appraisal cases, the most recent filing
statistics suggest that the new popularity of appraisal litigation is being
driven by other factors. The most likely explanation is that cases that
in earlier years would have been filed as deal challenges are no longer
viable after Corwin, Volcano, and Trulia, so plaintiffs’ attorneys are
choosing to file them as appraisal actions today.
New developments in Delaware, however, could bring an abrupt
halt to this shift in filing patterns. In several recent cases, Delaware
courts determined that the merger price is fair value for purposes of the

106. See Thomas & Thompson, supra note 99, at 1756.
107. This earlier round of reform measures is another example of the way that law firms adjust
to new litigation patterns. Jiang et al., supra note 43, at 698. In the mid-2000s, a small group of
hedge funds began to take advantage of the Delaware appraisal statute by filing a rapidly
increasing number of actions seeking damages. As the numbers climbed, signs emerged that some
of these actions, particularly smaller ones, appeared to be strike suits. Id. Seven Wall Street law
firms then petitioned the Delaware legislature to amend the appraisal statute to eliminate smaller
cases and to reduce the prejudgment interest rate awarded, among other things. Ultimately, the
Delaware legislature did make some, but not all, of the changes requested. Id.
108. Section 262 Appraisal Amendments, LOWENSTEIN SANDLER (Mar. 6, 2015),
https://www.lowenstein.com/files/upload/DGCL%20262%20Proposal%203-6-15%20Explanatory
%20Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/RYE6-2PGQ].
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appraisal proceeding. 109 This approach was recently considered by the
Delaware Supreme Court in DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value
Partners, LP. 110 The DFC Global court declined to adopt a presumption
that, in cases involving a robust market check and a fair sales process,
the deal price is the best evidence of fair value, concluding that the
adoption of such a presumption should be a legislative decision. 111
Nonetheless, the court emphasized the importance that deal price
should play in a court’s fair value determination. 112 The DFC Global
decision, coupled with a recent decision appraising a company’s stock
at a value that was less than half of the deal price, 113 may signal a
conservative trend by the Delaware courts that reduces the
attractiveness of appraisal litigation to plaintiffs and their counsel and
that reduces the volume of future appraisal cases as an alternative to
litigating process issues in a traditional fiduciary duty claim.
Our analysis suggests that, rather than adopting a broad
presumption either in favor or against deal price in appraisal litigation,
the Delaware Supreme Court should be cautious. Unless and until the
scope of traditional merger litigation has had the opportunity to
respond to Trulia, Corwin, and the adoption of forum selection bylaws
and reach a new equilibrium, we cannot be sure how these changes in
the law will affect litigation practices. Equally importantly, cutting too
big a swath out of shareholders’ potential remedies for corporate
malfeasance opens up the possibility that managerial wrongdoing will
go undetected. In other words, a broad appraisal remedy may be a
necessary additional safeguard to protect shareholder interests. We
develop this argument more fully in the next Section.
B. Type I Versus Type II Error
The Delaware courts and legislature have been engaged in an
aggressive campaign to stamp out frivolous shareholder litigation—this
was undoubtedly the driving force behind forum selection bylaws
109. See, e.g., Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., No. 9320-VCL, 2016 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 189, at *89 (Dec. 16, 2016) (giving “100% weight to the transaction price” where “[t]he
Company ran a sale process that generated reliable evidence of fair value”); Huff Fund Inv. P’ship
v. CKx, INC., No. 6844-VCG, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 262, at *49 (Oct. 31, 2013), aff’d, 2015 Del.
LEXIS 77 (Feb. 12, 2015) (finding “the sales price to be the most relevant exemplar of valuation
available”).
110. DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., No. 518, 2016, 2017 Del. LEXIS 324,
at *43–44 (Aug. 1, 2017).
111. Id.
112. Id. at *48 (“[T]he basic economic concept of fair market value remains central to our
statutory concept of fair value.”).
113. ACP Master, Ltd. v. Sprint Corp., Nos. 8508-VCL, 9042-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125,
at *2–3 (July 21, 2017).
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(targeting multijurisdictional deal litigation), Trulia (attacking
disclosure-only settlements), and the 2016 legislative amendments to
the Delaware appraisal statute (eliminating small shareholder
appraisal suits). While few, if any, commentators defend strike suits as
valuable, the danger of closing all the courthouse doors is that injustices
go undetected and unpunished. In other words, the price of getting rid
of bad cases by cutting back on the scope of the law is often
simultaneously getting rid of good cases that might have been brought
under the old rules. 114
Corporate law commentators have referred to this as the tradeoff between Type I error (false positives) and Type II error (false
negatives). 115 In the context of securities fraud class action litigation,
this hypothesis has been applied to the passage of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), a statute that was implemented to
address perceived strike suits. 116 In this context, the PSLRA is claimed
to have had two effects: it lowered Type I error by reducing the incidence
of frivolous litigation, but in doing so it increased Type II error by
blocking non-nuisance suits. 117 One empirical study has confirmed that
this trade-off occurred after the implementation of the PSLRA. 118
These trade-offs will also occur as Delaware cuts back on deal
litigation through legislative and judicial interventions designed to
eliminate strike suits. Certainly fewer bad suits will be brought (Type
I error will decrease)—that is apparent from the data that we presented
earlier in this paper. What will go undetected, but nevertheless be
equally certain to occur, is that Type II error will also increase. In other
words, fewer good cases that would result in substantial judgments
against corporate wrongdoers will be filed and successfully prosecuted.
How many good cases will we lose, and what will the impact of
their disappearance be? In 2015 alone, one commentator identified six
major settlements in breach of fiduciary duty litigation in the range of
$70 to $275 million in the Delaware Chancery Court. 119 Collectively,
these cases resulted in one year of over $900 million in recoveries for

114. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598 (2007) (finding evidence that meritorious suits that might
have previously been filed were deterred by the litigation barriers enacted through the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act).
115. Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 711 (1996).
116. Id.; Choi, supra note 114, at 603.
117. Choi, supra note 114, at 603.
118. Id. at 622–23.
119. See Friedlander, supra note 35, at 624–25.
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the shareholders in these companies. 120 There are other benefits to be
gained from judicial sanctions against corporate misconduct as well.
For instance, they provide courts with the opportunity to lay out the
rules of the road for deals 121 and give judges a pulpit from which they
preach to corporate directors about the perils of wrongdoing. 122 More
generally, because transactions are negotiated in the shadow of
potential litigation, the availability of a litigation remedy is likely to
affect both the price and procedures of future mergers. 123
These trade-offs highlight the need to assess the costs and
benefits of the litigation reform efforts in Delaware carefully before
embarking on further cutbacks to shareholders’ ability to challenge
corporate directors’ actions in mergers and acquisitions for fear we will
inadvertently cut off valuable shareholder monitoring efforts.
Litigation patterns will shift, and it will take time before their effects
on corporate behavior become apparent. The dramatic shifts that our
data show will stabilize in due course, and at that point it will become
apparent if more (or less) needs to be done.
For example, some commentators have recently called for the
immediate institution of a “loser pays” system in shareholder litigation,
arguing that deal litigation patterns are evolving too slowly and that
more needs to be done to stop frivolous litigation. 124 They claim that
deal litigation continues to be a significant problem for companies
engaged in corporate transactions because forum selection bylaws and
Trulia have only had a limited impact. They determine that “if Trulia
fails to eradicate the problem of socially detrimental litigation,
Delaware should reconsider its prohibition on fee-shifting bylaws.” 125
120. Similar settlements have occurred in other years as well. For example, in 2012, the
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a $1.263 billion judgment in a derivative lawsuit challenging
Southern Peru Copper Corporation’s acquisition of an affiliate. See Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault,
51 A.3d 1213, 1218–19 (Del. 2012).
121. See Davidoff Solomon & Thomas, supra note 9, at 10.
122. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997).
123. See, e.g., Albert H. Choi & Eric L. Talley, Appraising the “Merger Price” Appraisal Rule
(Va. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 2017-01, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2888420
[https://perma.cc/WM4B-MWXS] (arguing that the scope of the appraisal remedy affects the
negotiated deal price in mergers).
124. William B. Chandler III & Anthony A. Rickey, The Trouble with Trulia: Re-evaluating
the Case for Fee-Shifting Bylaws as a Solution to the Overlitigation of Corporate Claims 1–2 (Apr.
4, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2946477
[https://perma.cc/X2NE-JMHW].
125. Id.; see also Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions Can
Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN
CHANGING TIMES (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas eds., forthcoming 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2855950 [https://perma.cc/5TF6-FPST] (proposing a charter or bylaw
term prohibiting “corporations from paying attorneys’ fees for specified litigation outcomes”).
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In essence, what these commentators are calling for is an
extreme trade-off between Type I and Type II error. Even if Trulia was
100% effective in stopping disclosure-only settlements, it would not
eliminate Type I error since there could still be frivolous cases where
the settlement included other elements besides disclosure changes.
“Eradicating” Type I error is only possible by eliminating all forms of
representative shareholder litigation, which may well be the effect of
permitting fee-shifting bylaws. However, as we just discussed,
eliminating all forms of representative litigation would also eliminate
valuable cases that generate compensation to injured shareholders and
deter future managerial wrongdoing. 126
C. Delaware’s (Re-)Balancing Act
These changes in deal litigation, and more broadly in
shareholders’ ability to sue to enforce their rights, have further
implications in the age-old debate about Delaware’s competition with
other states both for corporate litigation and more broadly for corporate
charters. The debate between Cary and Winter over whether Delaware
law is leading a race to the bottom or a race to the top centers on
whether corporate codes benefit shareholders. 127 Many corporate law
academics have contributed to this debate, and while there are many
disagreements among these commentators about different aspects of
the competition, there seems to be nearly universal agreement that
Delaware has emerged victorious thus far in that competition. 128
The shifting tides of merger litigation may be stirring up the
waters of this competition again. The explosion in multijurisdictional
deal litigation was one of the forces that stimulated the Delaware
legislature to take action to validate forum selection bylaws. These
bylaws were intended to funnel cases out of other states’ courts into the
Delaware Chancery Court. However, as the legal rules in Delaware got
tougher on deal cases, the consequence was that plaintiffs looked to

126. Similarly, if the Delaware courts shut down appraisal litigation completely, it will result
in fewer good cases being filed under the statute—that is, greater Type II error. In the appraisal
area, there is a second negative effect on deterring misconduct as the discovery in these cases can
uncover fraud and breaches of fiduciary duties as well. The Delaware courts have permitted the
plaintiffs in these circumstances to pursue both actions. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d
1182, 1184–85 (Del. 1988).
127. See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1064–65 (2000) (summarizing the Cary-Winter
debate).
128. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).
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other jurisdictions as safer havens. States that had lost out to Delaware
in earlier times now may become preferred venues for shareholders. 129
The large number of plaintiffs’ law firms and availability of
alternative forums mean that litigation may migrate and that Delaware
rules may not have foreclosing or in toto effects. 130 In particular,
Delaware’s rules may not be adopted or may be circumvented in other
jurisdictions, particularly to the extent they are viewed as procedural
in nature. One court in New York, for example, went so far as to develop
an alternative legal doctrine for assessing settlements in disclosureonly litigation. 131
Other stakeholders in the corporate law competition have much
to gain or lose from these shifts. The Delaware bar, whose role as a key
player in this competition was first explained by Professors Macey and
Miller, 132 might well be worried about Delaware law shifting too far
towards the defense side viewpoint on shareholder litigation and the
resulting demise, or outmigration, of corporate litigation. While many
Delaware attorneys, even on the plaintiffs’ side, supported cutting back
on frivolous litigation outside of Delaware (and therefore supported
forum selection bylaws), they were much less willing to back feeshifting bylaws when those came before the Delaware legislature.
The responsiveness of litigation trends to the foregoing legal
developments highlights the delicate tightrope that Delaware walks in
balancing the interests of shareholders in minimizing corporate
wrongdoing against the interests of corporate management in avoiding
strike suit deal litigation as well as any conflicts with interests of other
stakeholders in the Delaware corporate law enterprise. If Delaware law
in this area becomes too favorable to any set of these players, then it
will get push back from the opposing set of actors. In setting up its
corporate law rules and enforcement, Delaware must take all those

129. A number of papers predicted, as a matter of theory, that this would happen. See, e.g.,
Armour et al., supra note 24, at 640 (“[B]oth for large M&A and LBO transactions, Delaware is
increasingly being bypassed as a litigation venue.”); Cain & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 16, at
499–500 (“[C]ertain states with an interest in attracting business litigation respond to this
jurisdictional forum shopping by rewarding higher attorneys’ fees and more favorable outcomes
when these states have seen cases migrating towards other jurisdictions.”).
130. See C.N.V. Krishnan, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, Who Are the Top
Law Firms? Assessing the Value of Plaintiffs’ Law Firms in Merger Litigation, 18 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 122, 143 (2016) (concluding that top plaintiffs’ firms “are significantly and positively
associated with a higher probability of lawsuit success for plaintiffs”).
131. See Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 148 A.D.3d 146, 156–64(N.Y. App. Div. 2017)
(setting forth an enhanced seven-part test to consider whether a proposed settlement merits
approval).
132. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest Group Theory of Corporate
Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 522–23 (1987).
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interests into account or risk losing its dominant position in attracting
corporate charters.
We do not suggest in this Essay that Delaware law has become
too restrictive—indeed, the statistics on merger litigation suggest that
the recent changes are quite modest and that the volume of litigation,
at least to date, remains sufficient to discipline the merger process. The
analysis is useful, however, in reinforcing the fact that the ultimate
check on changes in Delaware corporate law is the desirability of
Delaware as a state of incorporation.
CONCLUSION
We examine the shifts in merger litigation following substantial
developments in Delaware law regarding merger litigation, including
the Trulia decision. We find that Trulia and its progeny have
substantially disrupted merger litigation. Short-term effects include an
increase in federal filings, a reduction in Delaware filings and
settlements, and a rise in mootness fee payments. Moreover, while the
overall volume of merger litigation has declined, it is still very high.
One reason for the continued high rate of litigation, at least in
the short term, is that plaintiffs’ lawyers are attempting to evade the
restrictions of Delaware law by bringing claims elsewhere. Our
empirical results demonstrate a high degree of responsiveness by
plaintiffs’ counsel in terms of venue shifts as well as shifts in the types
of claims brought. We also see rapidly shifting tactics being employed
by defense side firms. The responsiveness of the lawyers involved
suggests that Delaware does not have complete freedom to adjust the
merger litigation ecosystem. The Delaware courts and legislature must
take this responsiveness into account.
Whether, however, these market-based responses will enable
counsel to evade the effect of Delaware law remains unclear. Forum
selection clauses may prove effective in limiting the ability of
opportunistic plaintiffs to bring cases in other state courts. Federal
courts may treat disclosure claims and settlements with similar
skepticism to that shown by the Trulia decision. And mootness fees may
not provide an adequate financial payoff to warrant the filing of lowvalue cases in the long term, despite the current sharp uptick of cases.
Furthermore, shutting down all avenues for shareholders to stop
managerial misconduct raises a strong likelihood of also cutting out
valid cases that would expose unwanted behavior.
As a result, we argue that the Delaware courts and legislature
should hold off on further litigation reforms. Instead, caution is
warranted until the full impact of the recent changes has been
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incorporated into the merger ecosystem and the federal courts can
address the rise in mootness fees. At that time, Delaware can determine
whether its litigation system provides an appropriate balance between
protecting shareholder value and limiting litigation abuse.

